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“[T]here ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men . . . .”
—Thomas Hobbes1
“[E]veryone is by absolute natural right the master of his own
thoughts . . . .”
—Baruch Spinoza2

* Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Political Science,
University of Toronto at Mississauga.
1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 480 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
Rev. Student Edition 1996) (1651).
2. BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE 231 (Samuel Shirley
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1670).
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“And such is the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be
compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward force.”
—John Locke3
“[L]ike you, I am indignant that the faith of everyone is not in the
most perfect liberty, and that man dares control the interior of
consciences where he is unable to penetrate; as if it depended on us
to believe or not to believe in matters where demonstration has no
place, and that reason could ever be subjected to authority.”
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau4
I. INTRODUCTION
The organizers of this symposium have posed the question: is the idea
of conscience fundamentally rooted in religious commitments? This
question inevitably draws us back to the seventeenth century, for that is
when the discourse of conscience ultimately originated. And when we
consult the most important sources from that epoch, we get, I believe, a
clear answer to the question, although it may not be the answer that the
organizers of the symposium anticipated when they conceived the theme
of this gathering.5

3. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27 (James H. Tully ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689).
4. Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire (Aug. 18, 1756), in 3 THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 108, 119 (Roger D. Masters & Christopher Kelly eds., Judith R.
Bush et al. trans., 1992).
5. In a statement of the theme of the “Freedom of Conscience: Stranger in a Secular
Land?” symposium, e-mailed to me by Professors Larry A. Alexander and Steven D.
Smith at the time I was invited to participate, they wrote:
Although “freedom of conscience” has been one of the long-standing and
central commitments of liberal constitutionalism, the commitment arose in a
world in which religious assumptions figured prominently in the framework or
worldview within which political issues involving religion and conscience were
understood and debated. “Conscience” was commonly conceived to be a religious
faculty, and “freedom of conscience” was understood in religious terms. Today, by
contrast, such matters are typically considered within a more secular framework.
E-mail from Larry A. Alexander, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, and
Steven D. Smith, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, to Ronald Beiner,
Chair, Dep’t of Political Sci., Univ. of Toronto at Mississauga (Mar. 12, 2009, 11:40
EST) (on file with author). The purpose of this paper is not to “refute” but, more modestly,
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The theme of conscientious belief arises in three pivotal seventeenth
century thinkers: Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. All three thinkers
emphasize that there is no point in trying to discipline belief because one
cannot help believing what one believes. But Hobbes and Spinoza open
up this space for conscience mainly in order to promote intellectual
freedom—a “freedom of philosophizing.”6 It is only with Locke that
this theme turns towards privileging sectarian conscience. In other words,
the core doctrine of conscience is given almost the same formulation by
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke—and as one can see from the fourth
epigraph of this paper, it was given an identical formulation by Rousseau
as well. However, the role accorded to the notion of religious conscience is
not equally central in these three theories. For all three, conscience
pertains to what cannot be touched by coercion because the conviction
of what is believed is inherently unshakeable. At the most fundamental
level, conscience is a matter of conscientious judgment, and this need
not be associated with any particular religious commitment; it can just as
well be the case that one’s conscientious judgment is that all religions
are a product of ignorance and credulity.7 This offers a way of disengaging
the problem of conscience from the preoccupation with religious conscience.
The historically prior issue is that of conscientious intellectual commitment.
II. THOMAS HOBBES
The purpose of this essay is to pursue three important iterations of the
same theme. Let us start with the first iteration: Hobbes. One does not
normally think of Hobbes as a theorist of conscience. Quite the
contrary, he is a theorist of sovereignty—of the unbounded authority of

merely to raise questions about the historical claim contained in these sentences by Alexander
and Smith.
6. See BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE xlix (Samuel Shirley
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 2001) (1670). This theme is highlighted in Spinoza’s
subtitle.
7. Jeremy Waldron argues persuasively that although Locke tries to exclude
atheists from the argument for respecting conscience in A Letter Concerning Toleration,
Locke’s argument, centered as it is on the notion of the impossibility of compelling
belief, has precisely the same force for atheists as it does for religionists. See JEREMY
WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY 231–32 (2002); cf. id. at 235 (“[I]t does not
make sense for Locke to [deny to] . . . the atheist . . . [the aspect of toleration proscribing
forcible imposition of beliefs]—since there is little prospect of forcible conversion . . . .”).
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the Leviathan, not only with respect to the demands of political order,
but also with respect to religion and the requirements of the civic cult.
The image of Hobbes as a theorist very far removed from an interest in
conscience or toleration is expressed quite powerfully in the discussion
of public worship in Leviathan, chapter 31.8
[S]eeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought . . . to exhibite to God but one
Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by Private
men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be
Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot
be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship
be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be
said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion
at all.9

The emphasis on uniformity in this text easily suggests that Hobbes is
hostile to religious pluralism and therefore—it would seem to follow—is
hostile to the intrinsically pluralized claims of conscience.10 But this
perhaps does not tell the full story. Putting the emphasis on public rather
than on uniform in our reading of the above quotation highlights the
implication that private conviction at variance with that public worship
does no harm to the state and its interest in outward conformity—as
Hobbes asserts very explicitly in other texts, as we will see below. This
implication is in fact intimated in an earlier passage in chapter 31:
[T]here is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the Worship that a
Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private person
exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect
of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the
multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the
Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.11

Hobbes thinks that unless there is a uniformly prescribed mode of public
worship, the unitary body politic loses its personality, but public worship
does not exclude forms of private worship, provided that these secret
religions are careful to stay out of the public eye. Provided that the
8. Jeremy Waldron offers a reading of chapter 31 in Jeremy Waldron, Hobbes on
Public Worship, in TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 31, 33–47 (Melissa S. Williams &
Jeremy Waldron eds., 2008). In my view, Waldron’s interpretation puts too much
emphasis on the idea of pleasing God and not enough emphasis on the strictly political
imperative of unifying the commonwealth.
9. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 252–53.
10. Cf. Alan Ryan, A More Tolerant Hobbes?, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 37, 39
(Susan Mendus ed., 1988) (“Defenders of toleration—usually expressed as ‘liberty of
conscience’—were friends of religion. Hobbes had no time for liberty of conscience . . . .
Hobbes did not have an explicit doctrine of toleration, in the sense of ‘liberty of
conscience . . . .’”).
11. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 249.
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canons of public worship are satisfied, Hobbes has little interest in
policing what believers think within the interiority of their minds or
consciences—an interiority that is out of “the sight of the multitude”12—
or even within the interiority of their own households. What counts is
the imperative of shared participation in political authority—not what
people actually believe—so a public display of loyalty to the civil cult
suffices; deeper scrutiny of inner convictions is beside the point. Indeed,
Carl Schmitt was of the view that Hobbes’s distinction between private
belief and public worship was, whether wittingly or unwittingly, a decisive
wedge that ultimately led to all the rot associated with the liberal tradition,
thereby subverting genuine social and political order in Europe.13 Schmitt’s
reading of Hobbes may be extreme, but it does highlight quite powerfully
Hobbes’s subtle and often unperceived affinities with what came to be
Lockean tolerationism.
If sovereignty were the fundamental principle of political life, one
would expect a diminished appreciation for the claims of individual
conscience or regard those claims as subversive of the exigencies of
political order. And that is in fact what Hobbes seems to be suggesting
when he polemicizes against conscience in Leviathan, chapter 7: appeals
to conscience involve a pretense to a possession of the truth in excess of
what human beings are actually equipped to obtain and therefore is tied
to forms of human vanity.14 “[M]en, vehemently in love with their own
new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain
them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as
if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against
them . . . .”15 But this polemical challenge to the rhetoric of conscience
does not tell the full story of Hobbes’s attitude towards claims of
conscience. Immediately before the text just quoted, there is another
passage that strikes a different note. Hobbes refers to the etymology of
conscience, suggesting not a unique access to what one claims to know

12. Id.
13. See CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES
74 (George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., 1996). For an interpretation of Hobbes that
also highlights proto-liberal aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy, see Alan Ryan,
Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life, in THE NATURE OF POLITICAL THEORY 197, 201–
17 (David Miller & Larry Siedentop eds., 1983), and Ryan, supra note 10, at 50–51, 56–
58.
14. See HOBBES, supra note 1, at 48.
15. Id.
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but rather a joint knowing, or coknowledge so to speak, of facts about
the world.16 With respect to this collective consciousness, Hobbes affirms
the rights of conscience:
[B]ecause [human beings participating in conscience understood as coknowing] are
fittest witnesses of the facts . . . it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act,
for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt, or force another so
to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto
very diligently in all times.17

Evidently, there is a double aspect to the profession of conscience for
Hobbes. It can be a rhetoric by which individuals with idiosyncratic and
often unsound opinions pretend to have a knowledge they do not possess.
But it can also stand for a shared knowledge that it would be illegitimate
to force knowers to disavow. Conscience is both a mask for unfounded
claims to knowledge and a way of upholding that shared possession of
(scientific) knowledge that finds itself subject to illegitimate coercion.
One may already suspect, right from this initial discussion of conscience,
that appeals to conscience within the sphere of religion correspond to the
(bogus) kind against which Hobbes polemicizes, whereas (what one can
call) cognitive conscience corresponds to the authentic form of conscience
that Hobbes wishes to uphold.
Hobbes’s tendency to identify the problem of conscience with the
problem of intellectual freedom is also supported by a discussion of
conscience that occurs near the end of the book—in chapter 46. The
context is an extensive catalogue of civil evils flowing from “[v]ain
[p]hilosophy, and [f]abulous [t]raditions.”18 The text is worth quoting at
length.
19

There is another Errour in their Civill Philosophy . . . to extend the power of the
Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences
of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of what they Hold, notwithstanding the
Conformity of their Speech and Actions: By which, men are either punished for
answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for
fear of punishment. It is true, that the Civill Magistrate, intending to employ a
Minister in the charge of Teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to Preach

16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 458 (italics omitted).
19. Hobbes does not really specify here who “they” are whose false civil philosophy
must be repelled. Different possible interpretations are suggested by the polemical pages
that precede this paragraph: (a) those who are bewitched by the false philosophy of Aristotle
and his Scholastic followers; (b) adherents of the Catholic Church; (c) more broadly,
those in the grip of what soon after Hobbes came to be called “priestcraft”; or, (d) according
to the broadest interpretation, all human beings who have not yet embraced the true civil
philosophy. See id. at 468–71.
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such, and such Doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the employment:
But to force him to accuse himselfe of Opinions, when his Actions are not by
Law forbidden, is against the Law of Nature; and especially in them, who teach,
that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a
false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith. For who is there, that
knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the naturall care of himself,
compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of
any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?20

Political theorists who are accustomed to harboring a fairly simple
picture of how Locke as a defender of the politics of conscience relates
to Hobbes as the representative of a radically opposed political vision
have good reason to be astonished at how much of the argument of A
Letter Concerning Toleration is anticipated in the final sentences of this
quotation.21 One can go further: if we did not already know that this was
a quotation from Leviathan, we could easily assume that they were
sentences composed by Locke!
But I want to redirect the focus of attention from the celebration of
conscience in the familiar religious sense at the end of this paragraph to
what I suggest is the more fundamental sense of conscience as intellectual
conscience at the beginning of the paragraph. The appeal to conscience
is very deliberately situated in the phrase “the very Thoughts, and
Consciences of men,”22 and the importance of (intellectual) conscience
as something sacred is driven home with greatest force by reflecting on
the Spanish Inquisition as the most egregious violation of this sacredness—
a mental inner sanctum, so to speak. The main reason why one must
stand up for conscience is that clerical authorities are not content merely
to exercise dominion over the souls of their own adherents; they also
insist on policing inner conviction in the society as a whole.23 Therefore,
20. Id. at 471–72; cf. id. at 480 (“[I]t is unreasonable in them, who teach there is
such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to
follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is
little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile [heads or tails].”).
21. For a forceful account that places Hobbes and Locke in much closer proximity
to each other than scholars usually do, see Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Locke on
Toleration, in THOMAS HOBBES AND POLITICAL THEORY 153 (Mary G. Dietz ed., 1990).
The same volume features a critical response to Tuck’s interpretation. See James Farr,
Atomes of Scripture: Hobbes and the Politics of Biblical Interpretation, in THOMAS
HOBBES AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra, at 172, 188–91.
22. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 471.
23. On the theme of what can and cannot be rightly policed by civil authorities, see
id. at 52 (“The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene,
grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do . . . .”).
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what is ultimately at stake for Hobbes in the politics of conscience is the
issue of intellectual integrity and the possibility for scholars, philosophers,
and scientists to think freely in penetrating the secrets of nature.
The next chapter of the book, chapter 47, again gives expression to the
double-sided character of the Hobbesian view of conscience that we
commented on above in the context of chapter 7.24 It is from this
memorable discussion in chapter 47 that we have drawn our epigraph
from Hobbes at the head of this paper, and the context for that epigraph
is worth reviewing.25 In this famous passage, Hobbes speaks of three
“knot[s] upon [Christian] Liberty” and how these three knots were in
turn “dissolved” in England from Queen Elizabeth I to the English Civil
War.26 The first knot is the power of excommunication imposed as a
quasi-political punishment for disobedience.27 The second knot is Episcopal
hierarchy.28 The third knot is the papacy.29 Elizabeth dissolved the third
knot. The Presbyterian revolt in the early stages of the English Civil
There is a natural distinction here between what is secret and what is public, hence the
project of an “Inquisition” into these secret thoughts constitutes for Hobbes a violation of
“the Law of Nature.” Id. at 471. This account of secret thoughts also links up—fairly
obviously—with the notion of secret and therefore free private worship discussed above.
See id. at 249; supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. Chapter 42 from Leviathan
includes additional important language: “[I]nternall Faith is in its own nature invisible,
and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions
that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, are injustice both before God
and Man.” HOBBES, supra note 1, at 360. Farr also cites part of this particularly
important language. See Farr, supra note 21, at 195 n.93.
24. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
25. See HOBBES, supra note 1, at 478–80.
26. Id. at 479. Hobbes’s presentation of himself here as a defender of “Christian
Liberty” may seem highly paradoxical—although it is not the only place in his work
where he presents himself in this way. For example, Stephen Holmes highlights the
interesting puzzle raised by the text in the Epistle Dedicatory to Leviathan, in which
“Hobbes claims to advocate a middle way between ‘too great Liberty’ and ‘too
much Authority.’ How can there be too much authority for Hobbes?” Stephen Holmes,
Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH OR THE LONG PARLIAMENT, at xlii (Ferdinand
Tönnies ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (1889); see also HOBBES, supra note 1, at 3.
Behemoth’s account of the opposing religious tyrannies of Papism and Calvinism might
suggest a different solution than the one Holmes proposes. Could Hobbes’s thought
have been the following—that in comparison with Papal tyranny on the one side, see
Holmes, supra, at 21, 172, and Presbyterian tyranny, or anarchy-cum-tyranny, on the
other side, see id. at 169, even absolutist monarchy—with its more modest claims on the
souls of its subjects—presents itself as a moderate compromise between liberty and
authority? Hobbes’s presentation of himself as a defender of “Christian Liberty,”
HOBBES, supra note 1, at 479, is one of many indications that Hobbes is playing a very
complicated game and that one should be on guard against taking his seemingly simple
doctrines at face value.
27. Id. at 479.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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War dissolved the second knot. And the triumph of the Independents over
the Presbyterians dissolved the first knot. This leaves the impression,
which Hobbes more or less asserts explicitly, that the outcome as of
1651, with Independents in charge of the regime, is a vindication of
Christian liberty—one that Hobbes himself pretty much endorses.30 The
question, then, is whether there is a fourth knot that has not yet been
dissolved. Does Independency represent the final triumph of Christian
liberty, or is it too part of the problem?31 My suggestion is that Hobbes,
in this text, once again presents himself both as a defender of the politics
of conscience and, at least implicitly, as a critic of it. To spell out my
interpretation a bit less cryptically: writing his book during the regime of
Cromwell, and soon to return to England as a citizen of the Puritan
commonwealth, it was probably not politic for Hobbes to fulminate
against the Independents in the way that he did against Catholics and
Presbyterians. This yields Hobbes’s strong pro-toleration line, with its
surprising conclusion that the triumph of Independency “is perhaps the
best.”32 But it could hardly have been Hobbes’s view that appeals to
conscience on the part of radical Protestants were politically innocent
amidst the turmoil of the 1640s. If this reading of Hobbes is correct, it
implies a crucial distinction between, on the one hand, the bad forms of

30. Hence the famous passage: “And so we are reduced to the Independency of the
Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best:
Which, if it be without contention, . . . is perhaps the best . . . .” HOBBES, supra note 1, at
479–80. Hobbes removed the passage from the post-Restoration Latin version of
Leviathan, which further bolsters the suspicion that his endorsement of the Independents
was opportunistic rather than principled. See Farr, supra note 21, at 196 n.94.
31. My own view basically coincides with that expressed by Farr. See Farr, supra
note 21, at 189–90. Independency, “‘if it be without contention . . . is perhaps the best.’” Id.
at 189 (emphasis added) (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 711 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651)); see also HOBBES, supra note 1, at 479–80. But is the
qualification satisfied? Was there any lack of contention among the sectaries of the
1640s? Cf. J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 181 (1971) (referring to the
“Erastian realization that the struggle against sectaries was a second front of the war
against papists”); see generally id. at 187, 192–93, 197. One could say that the fourth
knot consists in religionists thinking that their opinions are not subject to the larger
imperatives of political order and civil authority. One cannot enjoy Christian liberty if
society is in a state of civil contention, and one cannot avoid civil contention if the rights
of conscience are being abused by radical sects. Consider also the brilliant summary of
the core teaching of Leviathan quoted by Pierre Bayle. See PIERRE BAYLE, POLITICAL
WRITINGS 87–88 (Sally L. Jenkinson ed., 2000). It would certainly be hard to square a
doctrine of religious liberty with Hobbes’s teaching as thus encapsulated.
32. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 479–80.
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conscience that had brought about the summum malum in England in the
decade before Leviathan was published and, on the other hand, the good
forms of conscience that had to be liberated from the Inquisitors who
ruled Christian Europe. In the same paragraph in which Hobbes affirms
that “there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men,” he very
pointedly warns against the folly of thinking that any good purpose would
be served “by suppression of the Naturall Sciences, and of the Morality
of Naturall Reason.”33 Hobbes surely thinks that the rights of conscience
were abused by the holy anarchists who helped provoke the English Civil
War, but this does not mean that conscience per se is not a legitimate
source of human claims.34 In short, Hobbes is far more sympathetic to
the idea of conscience when he associates it with communities of natural
scientists than when he associates it with the radical sects that first
subverted and then appropriated sovereignty in the tumultuous decade
between 1641 and 1651.
III. BARUCH SPINOZA
Next we turn to Spinoza. Publication of the Theological-Political
Treatise in 1670 is exactly equidistant in time between the publication of
Leviathan in 1651 and A Letter Concerning Toleration in 1689. The
subtitle of the book already announces that “freedom of philosophizing”
is a defining concern of Spinoza’s political philosophy.35 Chapter 20 of
the Theological-Political Treatise is virtually a manifesto on behalf of
toleration and conscience, but Spinoza makes clearer than either Hobbes
or Locke that the respect for religious conscience in its pluralism hangs
on a logically prior concern for mental or intellectual freedom.36 In that
sense, Spinoza forms a bridge between Hobbes’s concern with intellectual
liberty and Locke’s concern for religious toleration.
Like Locke, Spinoza places tremendous emphasis on the idea of the
futility of trying to coerce the inner judgments of the mind. One thinks
what one thinks, and the judgment formed cannot be penetrated by external

33. Id. at 480. It is natural to read this as a reference back to the denunciation of
the Inquisition. See id. at 471. For an excellent account of the general project of
Enlightenment in Hobbes, see generally DAVID JOHNSTON, THE RHETORIC OF LEVIATHAN
(1986).
34. Vindicating the first half of this double thesis would require a detailed
interpretation of Behemoth. I try to develop such an interpretation in chapter 6 of my
book. See RONALD BEINER, CIVIL RELIGION: A DIALOGUE IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY ch. 6 (2011).
35. See SPINOZA, supra note 6.
36. Id. at 230–38.
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force. Spinoza tends to identify power and right, so that if the tyrant
lacks the power to coerce people’s ideas, he thereby also lacks the right
to do so.37 This is actually a pretty weak argument. We know today
from our experience of totalitarian states as well as totalitarian political
movements that powers of altering or manipulating people’s thinking
are available.38 There is no guarantee that in every instance individuals
will fall victim to this external manipulation, but equally there is no
guarantee that they will not. Brainwashing is not merely an invented
possibility; sometimes people are brainwashed by tyrannical states or
other agencies of social-political power. So Spinoza offers a rather shaky
empirical foundation for what is nonetheless a view of the inviolability
of mental life that is normatively very compelling. Whether tyrants can
or cannot mold our thinking, it ought not to be normatively acceptable
for them to do it.
Let us look at some of the texts. Here is the first paragraph of chapter
20 of the Theological-Political Treatise:
If minds could be as easily controlled as tongues, every government would be
secure in its rule, and need not resort to force; for every man would conduct
himself as his rulers wished, and his views as to what is true or false, good or
bad, fair or unfair, would be governed by their decision alone. But . . . it is impossible
for the mind to be completely under another’s control; for no one is able to
transfer to another his natural right or faculty to reason freely and to form his
own judgment on any matters whatsoever, nor can he be compelled to do
so. Consequently, a government that attempts to control men’s minds is
regarded as tyrannical, and a sovereign is thought to wrong his subjects and
infringe their right when he seeks to prescribe for every man what he should
accept as true and reject as false, and what are the beliefs that will inspire him
with devotion to God. All these are matters belonging to individual right, which
no man can surrender even if he should wish.39

At the start of the next paragraph, Spinoza does concede that judgment is
subject to being influenced by others and that therefore the issue of
37. Id. at 230. Spinoza’s illiberal-sounding formula is “the right of sovereigns is
determined by their power.” Id. at 231. The power to shape the inner judgments of the
mind is lacking and therefore so is the right to do so. Spinoza seems—paradoxically—to
be trying to found his liberalism on the antiliberal idea that political right extends as far
as political power. That is, the power of tyrants has much more stringent limits than they
would wish, and therefore it is simply a counsel of political prudence for them to
acknowledge the relevant implications with respect to the rights of conscience.
38. Compare the argument directed against Locke in Brian Leiter, Foundations of
Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935, 941–42 (2010).
39. SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 230; cf. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 51 (“Liberty of
Conscience is every mans natural Right . . . .”).
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whether our rights of judgment are empirically inviolable is not quite as
black and white as the opening paragraph had suggested.40 Still, Spinoza
insists that the almost unlimited pluralism of human opinions—what one
may even regard as a kind of seventeenth century anticipation of John
Rawls’s notion of the “burdens of judgment”—tends to teach us that the
assertion of our own judgment belongs within the sphere of natural right
in Spinoza’s rather idiosyncratic employment of the idea of natural right.41
Let me quote another good statement of the core idea of Spinoza’s
liberalism:
It is not . . . the purpose of the state to transform men from rational beings into
beasts or puppets, but rather to enable them to develop their mental and physical
faculties in safety, to use their reason without restraint and to refrain from the
strife and the vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by hatred, anger or deceit.
Thus the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom.42

Now I guess the question that is of interest to us in the context of this
symposium is whether this constitutes an account of conscience. I want
to defend the idea that it is. Spinoza’s reference to “beliefs that will inspire
[the individual] with devotion to God”43 in our first quotation clearly
situates this discussion in the sphere of what we normally associate with
the topic of conscience, namely conscientious religious belief. But
Spinoza’s way of framing the issue crucially presents these kinds of
assertions of religious conscience as a subset—a significant subset, to be
sure, but still merely a subset—of a larger range of conscientious judgments
that it would be impossible and therefore illegitimate for the state to
dictate. The natural right that Spinoza is fundamentally interested in
affirming is the right of exercising our “faculty to reason freely and to
form [one’s] own judgment.”44 That suggests to me that the idea of
religious conscience, for Spinoza, piggybacks as if it were on an idea of
the inviolability of individual human reason—a conception that, as will
be clear from the preceding discussion, strikes me as bearing strong links
40. SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 230 (“I admit that judgment can be influenced in
numerous ways . . . .”).
41. If something is natural, it is simultaneously and for that very reason normative,
and because it is natural for human beings to develop opinions that reflect their own unique
judgment, this spontaneous capacity for judgment formation and opinion formation
thereby vindicates itself normatively. Cf. SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 237 (“[T]he real disturbers
of peace are those who, in a free commonwealth, vainly seek to abolish freedom of
judgment . . . .”). The project of determining what people think is a self-defeating one,
and because it is unnatural to attempt the impossible, the naturalness of free judgment is
thereby vindicated.
42. Id. at 232.
43. Id. at 230.
44. Id.
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to persistent themes in Hobbes. It is wrong for the state to force the
conscientious Catholic or Jew to profess Dutch Calvinism for the same
reason that it is wrong for the Catholic Church to force Galileo to profess
cognitive beliefs that he conscientiously rejected. On this account, the core
meaning of conscience is the right of beings possessing natural reason to
exercise their reason according to their own lights and the inviolability
of freely arrived at judgments in the face of agencies of power—whether
states or churches, or states and churches working in tandem—that are
tempted—whether they can succeed at it or not—to try to negate this
natural right.
My fourth epigraph, the one from Rousseau, expresses exactly the same
conception. Rousseau also refers to religious conscience when he protests
against the situation in European societies in which “the faith of everyone is
not in the most perfect liberty.”45 But do these limitations on the liberty
of religious faith exhaust the problem of conscience? The rest of the text
suggests otherwise. Like Spinoza, Rousseau identifies the idea of an
“interior of consciences”46 that is impenetrable by power holders with
the steadfast rejection of the notion that “reason could ever be subjected
to authority.”47 And to cite once again the text from Leviathan, chapter 46,
which was discussed above, when Hobbes inveighs against the error of
“extend[ing] the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely,
to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of men,”48 the phrase “very
Thoughts, and Consciences of men” seems to carry the implication—on
my interpretation, at least—that the wrongness of violating the consciences
of men hangs on the wrongness of violating their thoughts.49 What we
see here is a consensus on the part of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau
that conscience and reason, or conscience and thought, belong together.
Let us consider one additional Spinoza text. Towards the end of
chapter 20—in the closing pages of the Theological-Political Treatise as
a whole—Spinoza turns to a discussion of the problem of religious
controversy and how it affects political order in a given society. He
celebrates the regime of (relative) religious toleration in the city of
Amsterdam and highlights the benefits that have flowed to Amsterdam

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, supra note 4, at 119.
Id.
Id.
HOBBES, supra note 1, at 471.
See id.
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from such a regime of toleration.50 Here is the passage in which he
spells out the lesson that he wishes his readers to draw from the contrast
between times of religious conflict and times of religious peace in the
Dutch experience:
[D]ivisions in the church do not arise from zeal for truth (which breeds only
courtesy and tolerance) but from lust for supremacy. From this it is clearer than
the sun at noon that the real schismatics [that is, the real disturbers of political
order] are those who condemn the writings of others and seditiously incite the
quarrelsome mob against the writers, rather than the writers themselves, who usually
write only for scholars and appeal to reason alone; and that, finally, the real disturbers
of peace are those who, in a free commonwealth, vainly seek to abolish freedom
of judgment, which cannot be suppressed.51

Although Spinoza does not use the vocabulary of conscience per se, it
seems perfectly reasonable to consider this an account of the politics of
conscience, for what is at issue is whether it will promote or undermine
political order in a society to leave the plurality of religious communities
free to come to their own conscientious conclusions without external
coercion. But this is not the only issue for Spinoza. The larger issue is
whether one can have a free commonwealth without freedom of judgment,
and—perhaps especially—what will be the status of independent thinkers
and writers within this regime of free judgment. Without question, Spinoza
thinks that a society that embodies religious toleration will secure a more
stable and more prosperous political order than one that submits theological
opinions to political and ecclesiastical scrutiny. But it is clear from this
account that there is far more at stake for Spinoza in the politics of
conscience than the prospect of civil peace between the various sects.
The larger issue is whether Spinoza’s own freedom of philosophizing
can be recognized as a natural right, rather than being subject to endless
peril—the peril of being at the mercy of the mob that is so easily incited
to persecute philosophers.
IV. JOHN LOCKE
Last but not least, let us turn to Locke. The argument supporting
Locke’s philosophy of conscience is no doubt the most familiar of the
three accounts surveyed in this essay, so we can probably give it briefer
treatment. The core purpose of A Letter Concerning Toleration is to
supply a principled basis upon which to distinguish the purposes of

50. See SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 236 (“Take the city of Amsterdam, which enjoys
the fruits of this freedom . . . .”).
51. Id. at 237.

1120

BEINER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 47: 1107, 2010]

11/29/2010 12:10 PM

Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

government—“Life, Liberty, Health, and Indolency of Body; and the
Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture,
and the like”52—from the purposes of religion—salvation, or “the care of
Souls”53—such that one can legitimately enforce a categorical separation
between what magistrates do and what churches do.54 The decisive
alternative posed by Locke’s political philosophy is the liberal separation of
religion and politics versus the theocratic union of religion and politics.55
There is no question that the appeal to conscience is much more direct
and much more central in Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration than
it is in either Hobbes or Spinoza. Consider the following famous text:
Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, and the way that he
appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be not thoroughly perswaded

52. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 26.
53. Id. at 26–27.
54. Id. at 33 (“[T]he Church it self is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from
the Commonwealth. The Boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles
Heaven and Earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two Societies;
which are in their Original, End, Business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and
infinitely different from each other.”).
55. Locke asserts that there is a single exception to his categorical separation
between the sphere of politics and the sphere of religion, namely “the Commonwealth of
the Jews, [which] different in that from all others, was an absolute Theocracy.” Id. at 44.
The claim is that “[t]he Laws established there concerning the Worship of One Invisible
Deity, were the Civil Laws of that People, and a part of their Political Government; in
which God himself was the Legislator,” hence in this unique case there was not, nor
could there be, “any difference between that Commonwealth and the Church.” Id. For
this reason, the magistrates of that particular theocratic state had no choice but to punish
“Idolaters” who committed apostasy against “the Mosaical Rites.” Id. Locke goes on:
Now if any one can shew me where there is a Commonwealth, at this time,
constituted upon that Foundation, I will acknowledge that the Ecclesiastical
Laws do there unavoidably become a part of the Civil; and that the Subjects of
that Government both may, and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that
Church, by the Civil Power.
Id. But Locke himself, a mere two pages previously, had in fact specified a contemporary
parallel case, namely the Calvinist theocracy in Geneva, and there is certainly no suggestion
by Locke in his discussion of Geneva that a modern state claiming a theocratic constitution
for itself can be rightly exempted from the liberal principles articulated in A Letter
Concerning Toleration. See id. at 42–43. This principled rejection of theocracy puts Locke in
theoretical opposition to both Hobbes and Spinoza. Hobbes was a fully committed theorist of
civil religion, and civil religion, like theocracy, asserts a union of state and church—
although it does so in order to subordinate the church to unbounded state authority rather than
the reverse. Spinoza, one might say, had a more schizophrenic view: his political philosophy,
paradoxically, straddles—or, more precisely, alternates between—Hobbesian civil religion
and Lockean tolerationism. I develop relevant interpretations of Hobbes, Spinoza, and
Locke in, respectively, chapters 5, 11, and 12 of Civil Religion. BEINER, supra note 34.
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thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it. No way
whatsoever that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience, will ever
bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed. I may grow rich by an Art that I take
not delight in; I may be cured of some Disease by Remedies that I have not Faith in;
but I cannot be saved by a Religion that I distrust, and by a Worship that I abhor. It
is in vain for an Unbeliever to take up the outward shew of another mans
Profession. Faith only, and inward Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance
with God. The most likely and most approved Remedy can have no effect upon
the Patient, if his Stomach reject it as soon taken. And you will in vain cram a
Medicine down a sick mans Throat, which his particular Constitution will be sure to
turn into Poison. In a word. Whatsoever may be doubtful in Religion, yet this
at least is certain, that no Religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either
true, or profitable unto me. In vain therefore do Princes compel their Subjects
to come into their Church-communion, under pretence of saving their Souls. If
they believe, they will come of their own accord; if they believe not, their
coming will nothing avail them. How great soever, in fine, may be the pretense
of Good-will, and Charity, and concern for the Salvation of mens Souls, men
cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no. And therefore, when all is
done, they must be left to their own Consciences.56

Locke calls this “the principal Consideration,” and it is indeed clear that
it is central to his case for toleration.57

56. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 38. Cf. id. at 26–27 (“[N]o Man can, if he would,
conform his Faith to the Dictates of another. All the Life and Power of true Religion
consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind; and Faith is not Faith without
believing. What Profession we make, to whatever outward Worship we conform, if we
are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well pleasing
unto God, such Profession and such Practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed
great Obstacles to our Salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other Sins by
the exercise of Religion, I say in offering thus unto God Almighty such a Worship as we
esteem to be displeasing unto him, we add unto the number of our other sins, those also
of Hypocrisie, and Contempt of his Divine Majesty.”). Locke’s reference in this quotation to
the “perswasion of the mind,” as well as his appeal to “the nature of the Understanding”
in the Locke epigraph at the head of this essay, suggests the notion that for Locke the
distinction between genuine faith and bogus faith hangs on the exercise of free mental
judgment. See id. (emphasis added). This in itself situates Locke’s argument in the
vicinity of Hobbes and Spinoza as we have presented them in this essay.
57. Id. at 38. For a well-known critique of Locke’s argument, see JEREMY WALDRON,
LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 88–114 (1993). Waldron’s basic
thesis is that Locke’s what-I-think-is-what-I-think-and-no-one-can-force-me-to-thinkdifferently premise is the sole foundation of his entire case for the self-defeating character of
theocratic politics. Waldron argues that Jonas Proast, Locke’s chief interlocutor in the
polemical debate concerning religious toleration, was right to suggest that there are ways
of shaping and influencing people’s conscientious beliefs, short of applying sheer force.
See id. at 112. As we saw above, Spinoza conceded this point in his version of the
argument, and apparently there are places in Locke’s debate with Proast where Locke
makes similar concessions. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. For an effective
book-length reply to Waldron’s critique of Locke, see RICHARD VERNON, THE CAREER
OF TOLERATION: JOHN LOCKE, JONAS PROAST, AND AFTER (1997). The thrust of Vernon’s
defense of Locke rests on the argument that the range of normative considerations mobilized
by Locke is much broader than the “principal Consideration” fixed on by Waldron. See
id. at 21, 29–31.
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One way of expressing the thesis developed in this paper is to say that
Locke, in A Letter Concerning Toleration, narrowed the scope of the
politics of conscience, relative to what it was in Hobbes and Spinoza—
although it is not to be expected that Locke was less concerned than they
were with the freedom of philosophizing, for he too was subject to
suspicions of unorthodoxy and to threatened persecution. The focus now
is squarely on problems of religious conscience. Yet Locke’s argument
certainly had implications—whether he intended them or not—for
thinkers whose most conscientiously held convictions were not necessarily
religious ones. Locke may have been perfectly sincere in arguing that
his regime of toleration did not encompass those who failed to embrace
some version of theism, but it seems clear enough that the logic of his
argument extends further. If toleration flows from acknowledgment of
the uselessness of coercing conscientious judgment, then this applies not
only to conscientious religious believers but also, with no less force, to
conscientious religious skeptics.58
Consider also David Wootton’s formulation of one aspect of Locke’s
theory of toleration: “[According to Locke’s line of thinking,] I ought to
regard my right to think for myself as inalienable. In no rational original
contract will I cede control over belief to the magistrate.”59 Wootton’s
formulation suggests that for Locke as well the notion of religious
conscience is simply a particular application of a broader conception of
conscientious believing what one believes. Richard Vernon makes the
similar point that Locke’s insistence that “the care . . . of every man’s
soul belongs unto himself, and is to be left unto himself,”60 although it is
motivated by a certain conception of what it is to hold religious beliefs
runs parallel to what he thinks the state may or may not do by way of
regulating the nonreligious sphere of life.61 Once again, the idea of
religious conscience seems parasitical, so to speak, on the more
fundamental idea of intellectual conscience: the “right to think for myself.”
However, Wootton goes on to argue that Locke is much less adequate as

58. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 7, at ch. 8.
59. David Wootton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 7, 99
(David Wootton ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2003) (1993) (emphasis added).
60. VERNON, supra note 57, at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id.
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a theorist of intellectual freedom than he is as a theorist of religious
freedom.62
V. CONCLUSION
Let us recapitulate our main theme. If we want to trace the origins of
the discourse of conscience, we need above all to go back to the
seventeenth century. It was in that century that key thinkers decided to
mount an intellectual resistance to the fundamental power structures
governing European societies, especially with respect to clerical hegemony
within those societies. All of this came to fruition in the eighteenth
century Enlightenment, but the intellectual seeds were planted in the
cohort of thinkers spanning Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Pierre Bayle.
But when one looks more closely at how the theme of conscience functions
in their key texts, we see that they were fundamentally concerned more
with the problem of how to think freely than with that of how to believe
freely. Issues of religious conscience were certainly not absent, but they
were secondary to issues of intellectual conscience. What was ultimately
at stake in the seventeenth century birth of the politics of conscience was
not just the liberation of sects from theocratic politics but the liberation
of minds from ecclesiastical domination.

62. Wootton, supra note 59, at 104–10. Cf. JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, RADICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT 265–70 (2001) (offering a sharp statement of the contrast between
Spinoza and Locke on issues of toleration and conscience).
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